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A Finite Element Analysis of the Utah "Thistle" Failure
Joseph M. Olsen

Blaine D. Leonard

Chairman, Civil Engineering Department, University of South
Alabama, Mobile, Alabama

President, LTR Associates, Salt Lake City, Utah

SYNOPSIS: In the Spring of 1983, a large landslide occurred near the town of Thistle, Utah which
blocked major transportation routes and impounded the Spanish Fork River, inundating the town with
200 feet of water. While much attention has been given to the slide and its impact, very little has
been directed toward a quantitative understanding of its causes. An analysis was performed of the
Thistle landslide using the SEEPSLOPE finite element system in order to evaluate the mechanisms,
factors, and causes of the failure. An elastic, perfectly-plastic stress-strain curve was employed
in the analysis to model the behavior of the overconsolidated clay soils. It is concluded that the
landslide was a compound, progressive failure which initiated at the toe and progressed uphill. Seepage forces played a significant role in the failure.
INTRODUCTION
Early in April 1983, motorists driving through
Spanish Fork Canyon south of Provo, Utah, began
noticing cracks in the road near the small town
of Thistle. During the next few days, the
cracks enlarged, the road began to heave, and
the nearby railroad tracks began to be distorted.
By the 14th of April, the Thistle landslide, a
Quaternary earthflow deposit lying in a small
canyon essentially perpendicular to the road,
had moved sufficiently to lift the highway,
sever the railroad, and block the Spanish Fork
River. Within 30 days, this blockage had filled
the canyon to a height of over 200 feet, butressing against a large sandstone formation known
locally as Billies Mountain. The small town of
Thistle was buried with 62000 acre feet of water.

This study was undertaken to quantitatively
address the geotechnical mechanisms involved in
the occurance of the Thistle Landslide. The
objective was to use a finite element stability
analysis to draw conclusions about the physical
causes and mode of the failure which occurred
there. Evidence is presented which demonstrates
that the slide was a progressive failure in overconsolidated clays which started at the toe of
the slide and progressed uphill. High seepage
forces played a significant role. in the failure.
BACKGROUND
The area of the slide is near the easternmost
edge of the Middle Rocky Mountain Province which
is characterized by generally high mountain
ranges and plateaus transected by deeply incised
erosional valleys. The toe of the slide in ·the
bottom of the canyon was at an elevation of
about 5030. The slide extended west approximately perpendicular to Spanish Fork Canyon a
horizontal distance of 1200 feet, and then
southwest another 4500 feet, reaching an elevation of about 5900 at the top. A twenty-foot
scarp at the top is noticable, and several related slides adjacent to the main slide mass are
also evident. Total slide widths vary from
about 850 feet at the top to 1200 feet just
above the bend. Below the bend, widths are
slightly less than 1000 feet (Duncan et al.,
1985). The volume of landslide material in the
canyon has been estimated to be between 3 and
6.5 million cubic yards (FEMA, 1983; Dames and
Moore, 1985; Kaliser and Fleming, 1986). Total
volumes involved in the landslide are generally
considered to be about 25 to 30 million cubic
yards.

Property damage triggered a Presidential Disaster declaration. Opening a passageway for the
Spanish Fork River and rebuilding transportation
lines through the canyon subsequently cost local
government and private entities in excess of
200 million dollars. The question of what to do
with the slide mass is still unanswered. In
addition, severe hardships were imposed on the
displaced residents of the small town who as of
early 1987 had not been compensated for the loss
of their property.
This mass of overconsolidated clay, over a mile
long and several hundred feet wide, has moved
several times previously in geologic time, and
has plagued the railroad lines for most of this
century with occassional track movements due to
creep. Deformation had been noted by some
during the early Spring of 1983 which was attributed to the wet weather conditions. Precipitation during the winter of 1982-1983 had
reached record levels, resulting in abnormally
high antecedent moisture conditions. However, a
movement of this magnitude had not been experienced in recorded time.

Descriptions of the geology of the Thistle area
are given by Witkind and Page (1983), Duncan, et
al. (1985), and Kaliser and Fleming (1986).
According to these sources, three formations
underlie or are present as outcrops adjacent to
the landslide. The Triassic Ankareh Formation,
which is a weak, reddish, shaly siltstone and

The geotechnical aspects of the Thistle landslide are complex and varied, and have been
treated only qualitatively in previous studies.
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sandstone underlies the Triassic-Jurassic
Nugget sandstone, a strong, light colored sandstone which in turn underlies the Tertiary
North Horn Formation, a weak, partly alluvial
partly lacustrine deposit consisting of mudstone, claystone, sandstone, conglomerate, and
liNestone. The valley in which the Thistle
landslide rests was cut from the Ankareh Formation which completely underlies the landslide
and is exposed an the north boundary of the
landslide. The. Nugget Formation farms the
prominent ridge that delineates the southeast
flank of the landslide and underlies the landslide in the canyon bottom. Duncan, et al.
(1985) concluded that "all movement of the
Thistle landslide apparently was above this
bedrock unit." The North Horn Formation is
exposed along ridges an both the southeast and
northwest borders of the landslide. The
majority of the landslide is composed of debris
and earthflaw material derived from the North
Horn Formation.

April 14, vertical deformation of the highway
surface was so severe that the road was closed
to traffic, and an the following day, the road
had displaced approximately 10 vertical feet
(Dames and Moore, 1985). On the evening of
April 15, the last train used the tracks
(Kaliser and Fleming, 1986).
From the first signs of movement considerable
effort was applied to prevent the Spanish Fork
River from being dammed and to keep the canyon
open. By April 17, it was clear that these
efforts were failing and the residents of
Thistle were evacuated. At this time efforts
had already turned to unloading what was thought
to be the "head" of the slide, in the area immediately upslope from the railroad cut. Attention
also turned to preventing overtopping of the dam
by the new Lake Thistle, and evaluating new
transportation routes. On April 22, Utah Governor Scott Matheson declared the area a state
disaster area, and on April 30, President Ronald Reagan made the Thistle slide area Utah's
first National Disaster Area.

The Thistle landslide is an early Holcene
(Kaliser and Fleming, 1986) landslide mass that
has moved on several accassions in geologic
time (Schroder, 1971 and Duncan, et al., 1985).
However, Duncan, et al. (1985) argue that there
was "no evidence that these alder, deep-seated
landslides, should they be present, were active
during 1983 or later."

Movement of the slide was measured by Railroad
and county crews during the first crucial weeks
of sliding. According to Duncan et al. (1985),
the Railroad reported that the landslide was
moving at about 0.75 feet per hour on April 14.
This average rate increased to a maximum of 2.5
to 2.8 feet per hour during the period of April
17 to 19, and declined to 0.80 feet per hour by
April 25. Total horizontal displacement for the
bottom of the slide during this period is estimated to be about 500 feet. Vertical displacements Of up to 1.5 feet per hour were noted
(Dames and Moore, 1985). Peak sliding rates
measured by Utah County were on the order of
6.6 feet per hour on April 19.

In approximately 115 years of historic records,
there is no indication of massive movement of
the Thistle slide, and no available written
accounts of small movement (Kaliser and Fleming,
1986). However, the slide has caused repeated
problems to the rail lines located at. its toe
(FEMA, 1983; Sumsion, 1983). The most recent
report of troublesome movements dates to just
two months before the catastrophic failure of

Ry the beginning of May, slide movement had
largely halted because of the accumulation of
slide debris in the valley and the buttressing
effects of Billies Mountain.

1983.

PHYSICAL DETAILS OF THE FAILURE
Opinions differ about when the 1983 movement of
the Thistle Landslide began. Kaliser &'7.Fieming,
(1986) report that in January of 1983 an official of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad reported cracks an the cut slope immediately west of the tracks which were "of size
and depth far in excess of normal." These
cracks apparently did nat extend upslope of the
cut slope. In early March (Kaliser and Fleming,
1986) , an inspection revealed that a set of
cracks had advanced upslope a distance of about
100 feet, but no material was noted on the inside track. Sumsion (1983, p. 12), showed a
photograph taken April 2 of an active slump on
the surface of the railroad cut at the toe of
the landslide. Tension cracks parallel to and
upslope from the railroad cut can be clearly
seen in the photograph.

ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
An analysis of the Thistle failure was performed

using the SEEPSLOPE finite element system which
consists of two component codes, CFLOW and WOODLUND. CFLOW is a code which calculates steady
state flow through nonhomogeneous media (Taylor
and Brown, 1967). WOODLUND is a stress analysis
program far plane strain conditions originally
developed to analyze underground openings in
rock (Chang and Nair, 1973). It employs an
elastic-perfectly plastic stress-strain formulation using a Drucker-Prager yield criterion.
These twa programs were combined and enhanced by
the Bureau Of Mines (Corp, Schuster, and McDonald, 1975} to analyze mine tailing impoundments.
SEEPSLOPE computations for the Thistle analysis
were performed on a Gould 9080 minicomputer at
the University of Utah College of Engineering.
Details of the implementation of SEEPSLOPE are
given by Leonard (1987).

The earliest official records of the Thistle
Landslide are dated April 13, 1983. At 7:30
a.m. on that day, Denver & Rio Grande western
Railroad personnel reported that their tracks
were out of alignment (Sumsian, 1983; Duncan
et al., 1985). As the tracks continued to
heave, the railroad attempted to keep the tracks
open. Late that evening, heave was noted along
the road surface of u.s. Highway 6 and 89, which
lay about 200 feet east of the tracks and across
the Spanish Fork River. By the afternoon of
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An initial finite element mesh was fashioned
which consisted of 1160 nodes and 1048 elements
along an axis approximating the centerline of
the slide. The mesh is 5800 feet long and rela·
tively shallow, as is necessary to model the
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which are more appropriate for slopes in stiff
fissured materials (Lambe..& Whitman, 1969),

actual failure.
Thicknesses vary from 180 feet
at the top to 265 feet at the middle, to 480
feet near the bottom. Topography is based on
USGS Quadrangle maps and post-slide topographic
maps prepared by the Utah County Engineer's Office.

The strength parameters for the materials which
participated in the slide are shown in Table 1.
vfuile there was considerable variation in the
measured values of friction angle and cohesion
(Leonard, 1987), there were data which suggested
that the upper 50 feet was slightly weaker than
the underlying materials. Accordingly, the top
row of elements was designated as soil 1 while
the remainder of the material above the claystone and sandston~ bedrock was designated as
soil 2.

Elements at the head of the slide were initially
100 feet long by about 30 feet high. Elements
in the middle of the slide were reduced to 50
feet long and about 35 feet high.
In the lower
portion of the slide, elements were further reduced to 33 feet long by about 30 feet high.
The majority of the elements are rectangular,
although some triangular elements were included
as needed to accommodate the physical boundaries
and mesh transitions. The CFLOW program uses
this initial mesh together with an estimate of
the phreatic surface to perform seepage calculations. As CFLOW moves the nodes which lie on
the phreatic surface to satisfy continuity of
flow, the remainder of the mesh is distorted
accordingly and element sizes vary.

TABLE 1.

Soil 2

Soil 1
phi

The finite element mesh was divided into four
soil types, representing the primary strata encountered on the site. Material parameters used
in the analysis were based on data from investigations performed at the site of the slide
under the direction of the Utah State Division
of Water Rights and the Utah County Engineer
(Duncan, et.al., 1985). While four principal
soil types were identified for analysis purposes, there was significant spacial variability
in the materials encountered at the site.

Case
Case
Case
Case
Case
Case
Case
Case

Very little is known about the precise pre-slide
hydraulic conditions in the slide mass. Permeabilities were estimated from post-slide tests.
Various inflow and outflow nodes were selected
in the CFLOW analysis to model infiltration and
known springs within the slide area. The SEEPSLOPE program calculated a phreatic surface
location and computed the corresponding seepage
forces.

I-14
I-15
I-16
I-17
I-18
I-19
J-1
K-1

c

phi

(deg)

(psi)

(deg)

11.0
27.4
11.0
11.0
20.0
20.0
11.0
11.0

0.0
0.0
106.0
122.0
33.3
122.0
122.0
122.0

9.0
27.4
9.0
9.0
20.0
20.0
9.0
9.0

c
(psi)
0.0

o.o
106.0
122,0
47.8
122.0
122.0
122.0

The first two cases represent the pure residual
shear strength condition. Duncan et al. (1985)
theorized that "antecedent movements had probably reduced the strength along the sides and
base of the slide to residual frictional values~
In such a case, the stress strain curve would
have no peak, but would level off at the residual value.
In addition, the cohesion intercept
would be zero. Case I~l4 uses the lowest residual friction angle measured on Thistle samples
in the laboratory. Case I-15 represents the
highest angles measured.

For the stress analysis portion of the study,
eight cases were developed, each with a slightly
different set of soil parameters. The cases
were designed to provide insight into the
Thistle failure, since it was unlikely that any
specific set of parameters would exactly model
the actual conditions. Six of these cases used
the full seepage forces computed by earlier portions of the SEEPSLOPE system. For the other
two cases, seepage forces were reduced by onehalf (J-1) or one-quarter (k-1) for all nodes
within or above the zone of failure. This was
done in an attempt to compensate for the assumptions of steady-state seepage and fully saturated conditions which the SEEPSLOPE system made.
:The transient conditions 1.and '.partially saturated soil zones above the phreatic furface believed to exist prior to the slide would yield
lower seepage forces than computed by the
steady-s~ate analysis performed by SEEPSLOPE.

Even in circumstances where residual shear strengths generally govern stress-strain behavior,
small peak strengths are sometimes developed
over time due to thixotropy.
In addition, portions of a slide which do not contain. previous
failure surfaces will exhibit peak strengths
before dropping to residual levels. In order to
model these conditions the soil parameters used
in case I-16 were modified to include a cohesion
intercept. An unconfined compression test value
of 106 psi was selected for use as a cohesion
value, representing the second highest such
value noted in the test data. A relatively high
value was selected in order to insure stable
results. Preliminary analyses had indicated
that lower cohesion values would yield a totally
unstable slide mass.

The materials in the slide were predominantly
stiff overconsolidated clays with many fissures
and zones of high permeability. The strength
of these materials also exhibited significant
spatial variation. While there was undoubtably
some minor excess pore pressure buildup during
the failure, the analysis was performed using
effective stress methods and drained conditions
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soil Strength Parameters for Soils 1
and 2 for Each Case of WOODLUND
Stress/Stability Analysis

Case I-17 uses sligh.tly higher cohesion values
in an attempt to bracket the true failure conaition~~t.

Case. I-18 represents the average frictional and
cohesion shear l!!trength
parameters from the
laboratory data. 1!\bt a true residual strength.
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case, b'lis set of data reflects a buildup of sone peak
strength due to thi.J<Otropy ot unsheared soils with diagenetic bonding. lhe cohesion values are different for
the two soils, reflecting the difference between the
average unconfined COI!pression values for soils shallower
than 40 feet and deeper than 40 feet.

TABLE 2.

Factors of Safety for selected Failure Surfaces
Failure Surface Number

case i-19 is intended to p=vide sone c:onparati'lte infor·..rration relative to the other cases. This case uses the
sarre cohesion intercept as I-17, but with a high& f:tic:±i,orL~le. ·. :(:t also uses the sane friction angle as
I-18, but with higher cohesions. The sensitivity of the
stress analysis with respect to these two soil pararreters
•..can be evaluated using the results of this and the two
previous cases. In addition, this COI!bination of pararreters fonns an upper bound on the strength envelopes
used for the analysis.

case

1

2

3

4

I-14
I-15
I-16
I-17
I-18
I-19
J-1
K-1

0.33
0.58
6.14
6.85
2.55
6.92
6.83
7.40

0.22
0.62
7.87
8.95
0.73
9.16
7.20
9.24

0.55
1.05
1.57
1.74
0.81
1.95
4.24
2.78

0.84 0.72
0.96 1.42
1.71 1.09
1.89 1.30
1.05 1.05
2.09 1.46
3.57 2.07
2.50 1.70

5

6

7

0.67
1.88
1.63
1.80
1.27
1.98
1.87
1.91

0.57
1.88
1.33
1.39
1.31
1.63
1.45
1.44

'!he last two cases use the sane strength pararreters as

case

I-19, but with reduced seepage forces. For case
J-1, seepage forces above the assurred failure surface
were reduced to one-half of their original values. For
case K-1, nodal seepage forces were reduced to one-quar:ter of their original levels for this case.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Sufficient data about the Thistle pre-slide groundwater
conditions are not available to accurately nodel the
variable transient conditions and resulting forces. In
general, the phreatic surface COI!pUted by SEEPSIDPE seems
realistic in its location and shape. Nodal seepage
forces, however, are probably higher than they should be.
Without the availability of !lOre detailed infoJ:lllation,
arbitrarily reducing seepage forces above the failure
surface is a sinple rrethod for app=ximating the transient a:>nditions. seepage forces were cut to one-half
and one-quarter their original levels and the effects of
those lowered forces studied in the stress analysis portion of this research. The effectiveness of this approach
is derronstrated in two sets of relationships. First, it
was evident in the distribution of failed elenents in
cases I-19, J-1, and K-1 that the number of failed elerrents in the analyses with reduced forces is less than in
I -19, particularly in the shallower elerrents. Since the
seepage forces were reduced in these cases for elenents
above the p=posed failure zone, this result is expected.
second, sone trends can be seen in the factors of safety
for the trial failure surfaces. Conparing case J-1 with
I -19, the decreased seepage forces yield higher or essentially equal factors of safety for five of the seven
failure surfaces. The average increase in factor of
safety is 27 percent. COnparing case K-1 with J-1, higher
or equivalent factors of safety are yielded for four of
five surfaces. The factors of safety for Surfaces 6 and
7 rerrain =ughly unchanged in all three cases. This would
have relatively low seepage forces •

Each of the cases analyzed had sone failed elarents
which led to redistribution of stresses during the
calculations. These redistributions were successful in
converging to a solution in all cases except I-14 and
I -15. In these two cases corrg;>Uted stress levels were so
high relative to soil strengths that nearly every elerrent yielded in early load incrercents. In successive
COI!pUter iterations, stresses were transferred back and
forth between yielded elerrents and convergence toward
a solution could not occur.
In all of the other cases a solution was P=duoed with
elerrents at or near failure clustered at or near the
bottom of the slope. Only case I-18 with lower cohesion
failed elerrents higher than app=xirrately one-third of
the way up the slope. In this case only the upper
approxirrately one-fourth of the rresh was stable.
In order to better oonpare the various analyzed cases
and nore fully evaluate the stability COIIputations for
the 'lhistle landslide, average factors of safety were

carputed for seven trial failure surfaces using data
f=m each analysis case. The seven failure surfaces
were selected specifically to aid in the understanding
of the nature of the failure. Weighted average factors
of safety were COI!pUted for each of the seven failure
.surfaces for each of the WCODLUND cases described above.
Results of these COI!putations are shown in Table 2.
Although the total length of the landslide is known to
be about 5700 feet, the depth and shape of the failure
surface is still in question, and it is tmelear whether
the slide is Itade up of one long failure mass or many
Sllall oonpound failures.

SEEPSIDPE was not able to carpute realistic factors of
safety for cases I-14 and I-15 which did not converge.
'Ihe specific results of these two cases I!RlSt be generally
disregarded, except as they relate to the overall failure
parameters of the Thistle slide. The results of these
two cases indicate that 'Ihistle was not strictly a recurrance of an old slide along a previously failed surface. Elerrent factors of safety were so unifonnly low
that transfer of excess stresses could not be accanplished. Even the high friction angle used in case I-15
was not sufficient to bring about stability. Based on
this information, it is likely that sone peak strengths
were involved in the failure.

Failure surface 1 represents the full length failure,
based on the theo:cy that the slide was a long, shallow,
a:>ntinuous failure mass. Surface 2 also represents a
relatively long, shallow landslide mass, but extends
only one-third the length of the total slide, and does
not conpletely c=ss the canyon floor. Failure Surface 3 is much shorter, and approaches the shape of a
circular failure. Failure Surface 4 was developed to
evaluate the validity of a deep failure. Sone have
postulated that the 'lhistle landslide involved a deep
failure which lifted the highway in the canyon floor.
Surface 5 is a small, shallow, nearly circular failure.
Surfaces 6 and 7 represent small, localized failures of
the landslide. A srrall failure of this sort could be
triggered by weather conditions or construction activity,
and rray lead to a larger, p=gressive failure event.
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All of the cases analyzed clearly indicate that the slide
initiated at the toe. Even when large numbers of elerrents
are yielded, as in case I-18, factors of safety near the
head are consistently greater than one. As the number of
yielded elerrents decreases, they tend to be located primarily at the toe. 'Ibis observation is st=ngly supported
by the failure surface factors of safety. Disregarding
cases I-14 and I-15, Failure Surfaces 1 and 2 never have
the lowest factors of safety for a given case. In addi-
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tion, in five of the six cases, the factors of safety for
these tw:l surfaces are considerable higher than those for
:the other surfaces.

progress up the hill. For instance, in case I-16, the
minimum factor of safety is for the short, shallow Failure Surface 5. With a factor of safety of 1.09, this
surface is near failure. Once this mass of elements
fails and the support is renoved from the mass above
Failure Surface 3, it is likely that Surface 3 will
approach instability. With the re.roval of elements n~
the canyon bottan, excess stresses would be passed to
elements higher on the slide, and lower factors of safety
would result. SUch a scenario supports the corrpound
failure theo:cy.

Tension cracking noted in a photograph taken ten days
before the slide began supports the argurrent that sliding
began at the toe. It has been suggested (Duncan, et al.,
1985) that it was unclear whether events at the toe or
the head were rore inp:>rtant in the initiation of sliding. Evidence from this study clearly indicates otherwise; the slide began at the toe.
With full seepage loads applied, the rost stable result
is yielded in case I -19. The distribution of yielded
elements clearly shows fewer yielded elements in this
case than in the other cases using a· full seepage load.
'!he failure surface factor of safety results also support
this observation. Fbr ~y given failure surface, case
I-19 yields a higher factor of safety then the others.

CX>NCLUSIONS AND RECXM1ENDATICNS

Several conclusions can be drawn fran this study of the
'Ihistle Landslide based on the results presented and
considerations discussed. 'l'hey are as follows:
1.

The 'lhistle Slide was not a sinple recurrance of a
pre-existing slide acting 100lely at residual shear
strength levels. It appears to be a ca:cp:>und progressive failure with peak strengths nobilizing in
many of the soil zones. While ancient slides have
occurred at this location and soma of those failure
surfaces may have been reactivated in 1983, the majority of the failure surface appears to have been in
previously llllfailed material. If this were not so,
stability could be seen in those cases involving
residual. strength parazreters.

2.

Analyses perforned in this study indicate that the
slide started at the toe and progressed ll};tli.ll.

3.

'!he failure did not involve a deep-seated, circular
failure surface or a long, continuous failure surface. It is rore likely that relatively shallow
masses of soil failed, progressively triggering
failures in adjacent, uphill zones.

4.

Seepage forces played a significant role in the failure at 'lhistle. As suggested by previous investigators of the Thistle. Slide, water in the soil resulting from high precipitation levels was definitely
a factor contributing to this failure.

Two observations can be drawn about the shape of the
failure surface based on results of trial failure surface COIIputations. First, the failure was not a deep

seated circular failure. Am:mg the six converging cases,
the minimuin factor of safety was associated with Failure
Surface 5 in three of the cases and with Failure Surface
7 in tw:l of the cases. Surface 5 is a very shallow,
circular surface, and Surface 7 is a superficial
sloughing failure of the toe. Failure Surface 4, the
deep seated failure, never yields the lowest factor of
safety. Second, the failure did not involve a long,
continuous surface. Failure Surface 1 yields the highest
aggregate factor of safety in each of the six cases.
Relatively high cohesion values were required to achieve
convergence and stability in the various analyses. Cases
involving low cohesion values, such as I-18, resulted in
nunerous yielded elerrents and low factors of safety on
the trial failure surfaces. ·Fbur of the seven surfaces
had factors of safety near or below one in case I -18.
None of the failure surfaces analyzed yielded factors of
safety less than one in cases I -17 and I-19. '!he cohesion value used in these tw:l cases was 122 psi, representing the highest value obtained in the laboratory
£rem unconfined COitpression tests. Since significant
cohesion was required to achieve stability, it seems
likely that soil strengths nobilized during the slide
were higher than residual levels.
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